休谟哲学及其观念理论随着新休谟主义的兴起重新受到学者的广泛关注。新休谟主义者施特劳斯提出“假设”与“设想”的区分,用以论证其因果实在论的观点。虽然这种区分在整个新休谟争论中饱受争议,但本文从关于这种区分的讨论入手,尝试更进一步揭示休谟观念理论的界限与范围。以一种动态的思想发展观点看,前期的休谟以印象-观念理论为基础建立了他的“观念-假设-设想”的层级结构;而后期休谟的观念理论不再能完全涵盖其哲学,因此呈现出“假设-设想-观念”的层级结构。David Hume′s philosophy and his conceptual theory have been widely concerned by scholars with the rise of the Neo-Humeism.Neo-Humeist Strawson proposed a distinction between"hypothesis"and"assumption"to justify his causal realism.Although this distinction is controversial during the New Hume debate,this article begins with a discussion of this distinction,trying to further reveal the boundary and scope of Hume′s conceptual theory.From the perspective of a dynamic development,the early stage of Hume established his"idea-hypothesis-assumption"theory based on the impression-idea theory.But later Hume′s theory can no longer fully cover his philosophy,so a theoretical level"hypothesis-assumption-idea"is presented.
机构地区兰州大学哲学社会学院
出处《宿州学院学报》 2021年第1期42-46,共5页Journal of Suzhou University
关键词因果实在论 假设 设想 观念理论界限Causal realism Hypothesis Assumption Boundary of conceptual theory
分类号B561.291 [哲学宗教—外国哲学]
