摘要 在随机需求环境下,构建了四种不同情形下零售商和双渠道制造商利用契约机制进行竞争的供应链决策模型,并给出了各情形下供应链成员最优决策和利润。研究发现,相对于供应链无任何契约情形,双渠道供应链中各主体均提供契约来增加自身需求和利润的策略并非始终是有效的,一定条件下供应链各主体利润均受损。当供应链中仅零售商为下游顾客提供提前订货折扣契约,而制造商不提供任何契约时,供应链各主体利润均达到最大。因而,对双渠道制造商来说,当零售商采用一定契约策略增大其渠道需求并降低制造商网络渠道需求时,制造商最优的策略并非是采用“敌对”的契约策略来进一步增加自身网络渠道需求,而是采用“搭便车”策略,不为下游顾客提供任何契约优惠,而从零售商渠道获得更多批发收益,并最终实现自身总收益的最大化。 In a random demand environment,we focus on a supply chain system which consists of a dual-channel manufacturer and a traditional channel retailer.We construct the operational model under four different contract strategies,and obtain the two partners’optimal operate strategies and profit.The results show that the two partners’profit may be both hurt when the two channels both provide the different contracts in their channels under some conditions.Furthermore,the results also show that when the retailer provides the advance booking discount contract,the optimal strategy of the manufacturer does not provide any contract in his online channel,but can take a free riding of the retailer’s sales effort,and then maximizes profit.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 北大核心 2021年第3期90-97,共8页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71902055,71520107001) 教育部人文社会科学项目(19YJA630033) 浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY19G020012) 广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2018A030313760)。
分类号 F274 [经济管理—企业管理]
