摘要 为使农村财务进一步透明化、规范化,保障集体资金合理使用,许多村庄实施村财乡管,即在保证农村集体资金自主使用权不变原则下,新设一层监督,需验证其是否影响集体资金使用。根据CHIP问卷设置,结合熵平衡法与倍差法,识别村财乡管与基层财务使用状况、公共品供给的因果关系。研究发现,村财乡管使基层财务收不抵支概率降低约26.8%,减少农村公共品供给。即村庄灌溉工程与小学教育概率分别降低21.9%和27.4%,但道路工程供给无显著影响。表明尽管村财乡管使得基层财务更加健康,但公共品供给不足现象恶化。因此,在兼顾农村自治与政府监督情况下,乡镇政府应在公共品供给上发挥作用,缓解村集体财权与事权不匹配的窘境。 Due to the disorder management of revenue in rural China,some villages are selected to be supervised by township government in the use of revenue.Although the right of collecting and using revenue is remained in collective,villages might still have incentive to change their behavior,when face the supervision from government.Exploiting the data from CHIP,the causal relationship between the supervision and the use pattern of collective revenue as well as the provision of public goods in grassroots was identified.The supervision from township government decreased the probability of financial deficits by 26.8%on the one hand,while reduces the supply of public goods in rural areas on the other hand.Specifically,the probability of providing irrigation projects and primary education in villages decreased by 21.9%and 27.4%,respectively,while no significant reduction was found for road projects.The empirical results suggested that although the supervision of collective revenue made the village finances healthier,it would lead to further deterioration of the supply of rural public goods.Accordingly,policy implication was concluded that it was crucial to alleviate the dilemma of the mismatch between the financial power and the duty of villages.
机构地区 浙江大学公共管理学院
出处 《农业经济与管理》 2021年第1期69-80,共12页 Agricultural Economics and Management
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDA024)。
