摘要 委托代理理论主要从委托人角度分析了企业委托代理关系及其后果,忽略了经理在企业的主导地位。文章从经理管理防御视角,依照公司股权集中程度影响经理管理防御水平从而影响资本结构调整的路径,分别建立不同股权集中度下经理人与股东对资本结构调整速度的博弈模型。结果显示:在股权相对集中情景下,经理人对资本结构调整动力强弱与其所受到大股东惩罚力度正相关;与大股东监督成本负相关,并且促使经理人与大股东“合谋”,容易引发“利益侵占效应”的第二类代理成本增大。在股权分散情景下,经理调整资本结构动力受公司股价与中小股东抛售比例的影响;由于信息非对称性导致经理人管理防御增大从而引发第一类代理成本提高。研究结论诠释了不同股权集中度下影响企业资本结构调整速度的传导路径和中介因素,为探寻公司股权集中度的最优区间抑制管理防御行为与动机提供了理论依据。 The modern principal-agent theory mainly analyzes the two-tier principal-agent relationship and its consequences from the perspective of the principal,ignoring the dominant role the manager play in the enterprise.From the perspective of managerial entrenchment,following the path that equity concentration affects the degree of managerial entrenchment and thus the speed of capital structure adjustment,this paper establishes a game model of the influence of shareholder-manager interaction on the speed of capital structure adjustment under different equity concentrations.The results show that under the condition of relatively concentrated stock rights,the strength of managers’incentive to adjust capital structure is positively related to that of the punishment of major shareholders,and negatively related to the supervision cost of major shareholders.It also urges managers to“conspire”with major shareholders,resulting in“benefit invasion effect”and raising the second agency cost.Under the condition of dispersed ownership,the motivation of managers to adjust capital structure is affected by the stock price and the ratio of the stock to be sold by minority shareholders,and the enhancement of managerial entrenchment level will lead to the increase of the first agency cost.The literature enriches the content of factors affecting the speed of capital structure adjustment and provides a theoretical basis for finding the range of optimal equity concentration.
出处 《西安财经大学学报》 2021年第2期91-99,共9页 Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“我国创业板上市公司控制权配置、经理管理防御与成长性研究”(71772151) 陕西省教育厅智库基金项目“陕西小微企业融资创新研究”(18JT009)。
关键词 股权集中度 委托代理理论 经理管理防御 资本结构调整速度 equity concentration principal-agent theory managerial entrenchment speed of capital structure
分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]
