摘要 上市公司高管隐瞒内部控制重大缺陷的行为会影响信息披露质量,损害资本市场的效率。本文主要考察了高管是否会因隐瞒内部控制重大缺陷而受到惩罚,研究发现:公司隐瞒重大缺陷会导致高管薪酬显著降低,且该结论在系列稳健性检验后仍然成立,这表明我国上市公司高管的确会因隐瞒重大缺陷而受到惩罚。在按照企业所有制分组的样本中,该惩罚效应仍旧存在。但是,该惩罚效应在机构持股高、所处地区法律环境较好的公司更明显,且随着管理层权力的上升,惩罚效应有所减弱。文章建议关注内部控制等非财务业绩指标对高管薪酬的影响,重视高管诚信在薪酬契约中的作用,并进一步完善独立董事制度和公司治理机制以实现权力制衡。 The behavior of senior executives'concealing major defects of internal control in listed companies affects the quality of information disclosure and damages the efficiency of capital market.This paper examines whether executives will be punished for concealing major defects in internal control.It is found that the concealment of major defects in internal control will lead to a significant decrease in executive compensation,and this conclusion is still established after a series of robustness tests,which indicates that the executives of listed companies in China will be indeed punished for concealing major defects in internal control;in the samples grouped by enterprise ownership,the punishment effect still exists.However,the punishment effect is more obvious in the companies with high institutional ownership and better regional legal environment in the region,and with the increase of management power,the punishment effect will be weakened.Accordingly,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions from three aspects:focusing on the impact of non-financial performance indicators such as internal control on executive compensation,paying attention to the role of executive integrity in the compensation contract,and improving the independent director system and corporate governance mechanism to achieve power balance.
机构地区 天津理工大学管理学院
出处 《企业经济》 北大核心 2021年第4期55-65,共11页
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司内部控制重大缺陷披露行为选择研究”(项目编号:71502127) 天津市创新团队项目“企业创新工程”(项目编号:TD13-5018)。
分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]
