摘要 为探寻员工建言与企业鼓励之间的关联性,运用演化博弈的方法建立了企业与员工双方策略选择的动态博弈模型,分析企业鼓励对员工建言决策的作用机理和影响机制,观察不同初始条件下企业与员工决策组合的变化。随后,使用仿真手段检验博弈双方决策路径的可信度并分析重要影响因素的结合作用,为员工建言研究探寻新的视角。结果表明:员工建言与企业鼓励只有在特定初始条件下才存在关联关系。同时,还发现在双方决策交互影响的情况下,企业给予建言员工的奖励并不是越多越好,奖励的数额存在最优解,但具体取值受到建言双方各自的成本收益影响。因此,企业应该做好事前预判,确保策略选择准确;降低建言成本,增强建言获得感;主动出击,打破博弈僵局;在设置员工建言奖励的数额标准时,应当量力而行、定期调整。 In order to explore the relationship between employee voice and enterprise encouragement,this paper establishes a dynamic game model of strategy selection between enterprises and employees by using the evolutionary game method,analyzes the action mechanism and influence mechanism of enterprise encouragement on employee voice and decision-making,and observes the changes in the decision-making portfolio of enterprises and employees under different initial conditions.Subsequently,simulation methods are used to test the credibility of the decision-making paths of the two sides of the game and analyze the combined effect of important influencing factors to explore new perspectives for the research of employee voice.The results show that there is an association between employee voice and enterprise encouragement only under certain initial conditions.At the same time,it is also found that in the case of mutual influence of the two parties'decision-making,the company does not give as many rewards as possible to suggesting employees.There is an optimal solution for the amount of rewards,but the specific value is affected by the respective costs and benefits of both parties.Therefore,enterprises should make advance judgments to ensure accurate strategic choices;reduce the cost of voice and enhance the sense of gain;take the initiative to break the game deadlock;and do their best and make regular adjustment when setting the amount of employee voice rewards.
机构地区 华东交通大学经济管理学院
出处 《企业经济》 北大核心 2021年第4期66-72,共7页
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“城镇化下低碳城市建设中的碳减排经济政策工具研究”(项目编号:71463028) 江西省经济社会发展智库项目“江西加快众创空间和网络众创平台发展研究”(项目编号:16ZK17) 江西省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目“成长型思维视角下员工抗逆力作用机制与干预研究”(项目编号:JC18205)。
关键词 员工建言 企业鼓励行为 演化博弈 稳定状态 employee voice enterprise encouragement behavior evolutionary game stable state
