摘要 针对决策者的互惠偏好行为建立政府干预下的闭环供应链博弈模型,探讨了政府干预参数和互惠偏好系数对闭环供应链决策的影响,并对两种干预策略的效果进行了比较分析。研究表明:奖惩干预下,回收商对制造商的关注不仅不会诱导制造商给予回报,反而加剧自身利润的侵蚀;置换补贴干预下,随着置换敏感系数的增大,零售商的利润小幅增加,置换量和制造者的利润显著提高;政府干预下,互惠偏好在降低奖惩力度而提高置换补贴额度的同时会提高社会福利,并且合理的互惠系数可以触发成员的互惠互利行为,在合理的互惠区域内,互惠共赢的正效应能够提高成员的利润,从而提升闭环供应链的经济效益和环境效益。 According to the reciprocal preference behavior characteristic of decision makers,the closed-loop supply chain model under government intervention was established.The influence of the optimal government intervention parameters and reciprocal preference on the optimal decision-making of closed-loop supply chain were discussed and the effect of the two intervention strategies were compared and analyzed.The results show that under the intervention of rewards and punishments,the attention of recycler to manufacturer can′t induce manufacturer to give returns,but aggravate the erosion of one′s own profits. Under the intervention of replacement subsidy,with the increase of replacement sensitivity coefficient,the retailer′s profits increase slightly,and the replacement quantity and the manufacturer′s profits increase significantly. Under the government intervention,reciprocal preference can reduce reward and punishment quota,increase the amount of replacement subsidy,and improve social welfare. Reasonable and effective reciprocity coefficient can trigger the reciprocal behavior of members.In a reasonable reciprocal region,the positive effect of mutual benefit and winwin can improve the profits of members,and then improve the economic and environmental benefits of the closed-loop supply chain.
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2021年第1期111-120,共10页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972100,71372186)。
关键词 政府干预 闭环供应链 互惠偏好 合理互惠区域 government intervention closed-loop supply chain reciprocity preference reasonable reciprocal region
