摘要 针对一个同时生产新能源汽车与燃油车的制造商和两个分别销售两类汽车的零售商组成的二级汽车供应链,将政府实施的双积分制与拉动市场需求的消费者偏好纳入到供应链收益模型的构建中,运用斯坦伯格博弈理论求得独立与合作决策模式下制造商、零售商的最优生产与定价策略,并从积分价格、消费者偏好、积分办法调整等角度对模型进行分析,在此基础上对模型进行了数值计算。结果表明:采取合作决策模式对汽车供应链的整体收益更加有利;积分价格的变化不但影响汽车供应链的收益,还会影响新能源汽车的市场规模;燃油车和新能源汽车积分管理办法的调整对新能源汽车扩散至关重要。 To explore the optimal production and pricing strategy of a manufacturer and two retailers in the context of dual-credit system and consumer preference with independent and cooperative decision-making models,the two-echelon vehicles supply chains were studied. The manufacturer produced new energy vehicles(NEV)and gas vehicles(GV),and one of the retailers sold NEV and the other sold GV.The revenue models of supply chains were established with dualcredit regulation and consumer preference.Then the Stackelberg game theory were used to solve the models. Furthermore,the models were analyzed from the adjustment of credit price,consumers preference and the credit rules,and then some numerical calculations were conducted.The results show that the cooperative decision-making model is more beneficial than the independent one.And then the credit price not only affect the revenue of automotive supply chain but also the market size of new energy vehicles.Finally,the adjustment for credit rules of GV and NEV is crucial to the diffusion of new energy vehicles industry.
机构地区 沈阳航空航天大学经济与管理学院
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2021年第1期121-129,共9页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71702112) 教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(17YJA630139) 沈阳市哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(SC19006Q) 辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L19CGL008)。
关键词 新能源汽车 传统燃油车 双积分制 消费者偏好 博弈论 new energy vehicles traditional gas vehicles dual-credit regulation consumer preference game theory
