摘要 基于演化博弈理论,从市场机制和政府监管两个角度分析军民融合产业政产学研合作创新行为及其影响因素。构建博弈模型观察多个利益相关者的合作行为,结合复制动态方程分析演化稳定策略的选择,并仿真验证了理论研究。结果发现:在市场机制下政府补贴、违约金和收益分配系数对军民融合企业和学研机构开展合作创新有显著影响,但作用机制不同;在政府监管下合理税率、行政处罚有利于维护军民融合产业合作创新的稳定性。此外,政府在与企业、学研机构博弈中获得了最大化的额外社会收益,这样的"利益诉求"将增加其参与合作创新活动的积极性。 based on the evolutionary game theory,the innovative behavior of GovernmentIndustry-University-Research(GIUR) cooperation in civil-military integration industry and its influencing factors were analyzed from the perspective of market mechanism and government supervision.The cooperative innovation behavior of multi-stakeholders was observed by constructing game model,and the selection of evolutionary stability strategy was analyzed by combining replication dynamic equation. The theoretical research was verified by simulation.The results show that reasonable government subsidies,liquidated damages and income distribution coefficient under the market mechanism are beneficial to the choice of cooperation and innovation between civil-military integration enterprises and academic research institutions.The administrative penalty and reasonable tax rate under the supervision of the government are conducive to promoting the stability of civil-military integration industry cooperation and innovation.In addition,the government gains the maximum additional social benefits in the game with enterprises and academic research institutions.Such "interest demands" will increase its enthusiasm to participate in cooperative innovation activities.
机构地区 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院 清华大学经济管理学院
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2021年第1期139-147,共9页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273072) 国家自然科学基金应急管理项目(71841054) 黑龙江省自然科学基金(LH2019G014)。
关键词 演化博弈 军民融合产业 政产学研 合作创新 evolutionary game civil-military integration industry GIUR cooperative innovation
