摘要 本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约,此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。 This paper studies the equilibrium pricing decisions of supply chain for a risk-averse manufacturer with corporate social responsibility and two risk-averse competitive retailers.The impacts of supply chain player’s risk aversion,the rival market demand uncertainty and correlation,the manufacturer’s corporate social responsibility level on equilibrium pricing are discussed using Stackelberg game model.The research shows that when the manufacturer takes corporate social responsibility,the effect of risk aversion on supply chain decision-making will depend on the level of corporate social responsibility.When market uncertainty or demand correlation is higher,the manufacturer with higher corporate social responsibility level will provide lower wholesale price.At this time,the retail price decreases with a high level of corporate social responsibility while the consumer welfare increases.When the cost of product is low,consumer welfare increases with the corporate social responsibility level.When the cost of product is high,consumer welfare always decreases.
机构地区 青岛大学商学院 曲阜师范大学管理学院
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 北大核心 2021年第4期47-53,共7页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(11401331,11671220) 教育部人文社科资助项目(18YJC630119) 中国博士后面上项目(2016M592148) 山东省博士后创新基金(201603063) 青岛市博士后项目(2016032) 山东省高校人文社会科学项目资助(J17RA107)。
关键词 供应链管理 企业社会责任 风险规避 STACKELBERG博弈 supply chain management corporate social responsibility risk aversion Stackelberg game
分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]
