摘要 利用Tullock竞赛函数对混合生产的产品质量战略进行讨论。研究表明,混合生产会促进产品质量的提升,在一定条件下,制造商的产品质量甚至会高于单一自制下的产品质量;若外包供应商收取的批发价格足够低,制造商更倾向于混合生产而非单一外包和单一自制;实施混合生产可能会伤害外包供应商;制造商偏好烈性较强的质量竞赛,而外包供应商偏好烈性较弱的质量竞赛。 Employing the Tullock contest success function,a noncooperative game model is established to explain how the players compete in the quality contest.The strategy of pooling production definitely brings supplier's quality improvement with comparison to outsourcing while conditionally making the manufacturer's product quality higher than in-house manufacturing.The manufacturer prefers pooling production to outsourcing and in-house manufacturing if the wholesale price charged by the supplier is sufficient low enough.However,the supplier could be hurt by the implementation of pooling production when comparing with outsourcing.Additionally,the manufacturer may prefer a fiercer contest,while the supplier may enjoy a more temperate contest.
机构地区 上海海事大学经济管理学院 南通大学经济与管理学院
出处 《工业工程》 北大核心 2021年第2期43-48,84,共7页 Industrial Engineering Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771127) 南通市社科基金资助项目(2017CNT009)。
关键词 供应链质量管理 Tullock竞赛函数 混合生产 博弈论 supply chain quality management the Tullock contest success function pooling production game theory
